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389 
SUBPRECEDENTS 
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF 
PRECEDENT. By Randy J. Kozel.1 Cambridge University 
Press. 2017. PP. x + 180. $99.99 (hardcover), $34.99 (paper). 
Jason Mazzone2 
Not all precedent is equal. Some precedents are given more 
weight, are harder to overturn, than are others. Super-
precedents,3 even super-duper-precedents,4 have special status.5 
Legal academics consider them canonized;6 judges cite them with 
reverence;7 and judicial nominees, mum on whether they agree or 
 
 1. Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. 
 2. Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law and Director, Program in Constitutional 
Theory, History and Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
 3. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (2006) 
(“[A]t least as a descriptive matter, there may be something akin to ‘super precedent’ in 
constitutional law.”); Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 363, 364 (discussing origins of the term “super-precedent”); Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do 
You Believe in ‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y, TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at C1. 
 4. Senator Arlen Spector used the term “super-duper precedent” at the 2005 
confirmation hearing of John G. Roberts. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of 
John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 144–45 (2005) (asking Roberts whether Roe v. Wade was a 
“super-duper precedent in light . . . of 38 occasions to overrule it”). 
 5. Not everyone agrees that the term, super-precedent, is a useful way to understand 
cases. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Don’t Talk to Me About Superprecedents, 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/10/dont-talk-to-me-about-superprecedents.html (Oct. 
30, 2005) (last visited May 3, 2018) (describing the term “super-precedent” as “highly 
misleading”). There is also room for disagreement about what counts as super-precedent, 
though some cases make many lists. See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential 
Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1734–35 (2013) (“The following cases are included 
on most hit lists of superprecedent: Marbury v. Madison, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 
Helvering v. Davis, the Legal Tender Cases, Mapp v. Ohio, Brown v. Board of Education, 
and the Civil Rights Cases.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 6. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 
1752 (2007) (“The Supreme Court has an institutional obligation to recognize that 
superprecedents crystallize fixed points in our constitutional tradition, and should not be 
overruled or ignored in the course of doctrinal development. . . . [S]uperprecedents 
resemble formal amendments, . . . in the operational canon.”). 
 7. One example comes from the competing claims by the Justices in the majority 
and in the dissent to the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education (a decision virtually 
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disagree with the outcomes in lesser cases, announce their 
commitment to our super-precedents.8 If, compared to regular old 
precedents, some precedents count for more, might other 
precedents count for less? This essay makes the case for 
subprecedents: precedents that have only weak value, such that 
compared to other precedents, they are more easily ignored and 
easier to overturn. In his book, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of 
Precedent, Randy Kozel depicts a world in which judges (and 
particularly Supreme Court Justices) jockey to render their own 
rulings impervious to change and seek to elevate their own 
supporting rationales, hypotheticals, commentary, and even stray 
statements to the level of binding law, and in which the winners in 
high-stakes disputes over interpretive methodology and 
normative considerations get to shape and solidify legal rules for 
the nation. This essay, prepared for a symposium on Kozel’s book, 
tells a different story: of efforts to minimize the significance of 
judicial decisions, to limit their reach and power, and to curtail the 
work they may do in future cases. Kozel’s account is one of 
aggressive judicial ambition; mine, of deliberate timidity. Yet a 
full understanding of precedent requires attention to cases that 
start out or end up having limited precedential value. 
Subprecedents, this essay shows, serve some important, and at 
times surprising, functions in a system of stare decisis. 
Consideration of subprecedents thus sheds light on the questions 
that motivate Kozel’s own study and on his noteworthy efforts to 
ground stare decisis in a “commitment to the abiding continuity 
of constitutional law” (p. 135) by shifting the operations of 
precedent away from the predilections of individual judges. 
The essay proceeds in seven parts. Each part identifies, in 
field-guide fashion, a specific kind of subprecedent (illustrated 
with a case or two), describes its characteristics, and discusses its 
roles and significance. The focus throughout is primarily (but not 
 
everyone considers a superprecedent) in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 8. Compare Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be 
an Associate Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 452 (2006) (describing Brown as “one of the greatest, if not the single greatest 
thing that the Supreme Court of the United States has ever done”), with id. at 432 (stating, 
in response to a question about whether he believed the Constitution protects a right to 
abortion, that “if I am confirmed and if this issue were to come up, the first question that 
would have to be addressed is the question of stare decisis. . . . And then if I were to get 
beyond that . . . then I would have to go through the whole judicial decisionmaking process 
before reaching a conclusion”). 
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exclusively) on constitutional cases, though it bears mentioning 
that a similar category of subprecedents could be developed for 
statutory decisions; likewise, while the focus here is on rulings by 
the Supreme Court of the United States, the approach could be 
extended to the lower federal courts and to the state courts, all of 
which decide far more cases than does the U.S. Supreme Court. 
A short conclusion draws some general lessons and discusses their 
implications. 
I. GOLDEN TICKETS 
Every now and then, in the style of a papal dispensation or a 
royal pardon to a prisoner whose neck is noosed, the U.S. 
Supreme Court sets aside the normal rules to help a criminal 
defendant screwed by the system. Typically, in such cases, the 
defendant has suffered, through no fault of his own, some terrible 
legal fate. His plight cries out for a remedy but the law is against 
him. The Supreme Court is sympathetic but it is also disinclined 
to announce a new legal rule that will have broad effect. The 
Court’s solution is to issue the defendant what is in essence a 
golden ticket: a decision tailored to the precise circumstances of 
the case, designed to benefit the defendant but nobody else. 
Indeed, in such cases, the Court may specifically warn against 
anybody else applying the ruling in other circumstances to benefit 
different defendants (for only popes and kings get to exercise this 
sort of power). The resulting Supreme Court ruling, in favor of 
the single defendant, represents a subprecedent. 
Maples v. Thomas,9 decided in 2012, is a prime example. In 
that case, petitioner Cory Maples was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death in 1997 in Alabama.10 Maples sought post-
conviction relief in state court, alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel and other trial and penalty-phase errors.11 His petition 
was prepared on a pro bono basis by two associates of the New 
York law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell.12 While the petition was 
pending in Alabama, the two associates left the firm for other 
positions that prevented them from continuing to represent 
Maples, but without advising him they were no longer his lawyers, 
 
 9. 565 U.S. 266 (2012). 
 10. Id. at 270. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
4 - MAZZONE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/6/18 10:55 AM 
392 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:389 
 
filing a motion to withdraw, arranging for new counsel, or even 
notifying the Alabama courts of the change in their status.13 When 
the Alabama trial court denied Maples’ petition, it sent notices of 
the decision to the associates at Sullivan & Cromwell, but because 
they had left the firm, the mailroom there returned the notices 
unopened to the court.14 The time ran out for Maples to appeal 
the trial court denial without Maples even knowing he no longer 
actually had a lawyer.15 Subsequently, after learning from the 
Alabama prosecutor’s office that he had lost in trial court and that 
the time to appeal had expired, Maples, represented by new 
counsel, filed a federal habeas petition.16 The district court 
dismissed the petition on the ground that Maples had 
procedurally defaulted—by failing timely to appeal the Alabama 
trial court’s order—and there was no cause to excuse the default.17 
The 11th Circuit affirmed.18 
Ordinarily, the circuit court ruling would be the end of the 
road for Cory Maples because even if it wrongly applied the law, 
that is not normally a basis for the U.S. Supreme Court to hear a 
case.19 Yet the Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, 
reversed.20 Her opinion favored Maples—but was deliberately 
and precisely tailored to him alone. “The sole question this Court 
has taken up for review,” Ginsburg wrote, “is whether, on the 
extraordinary facts of Maples’ case, there is ‘cause’ to excuse the 
default.”21 In holding that such cause did exist, the ruling tracked 
the exact circumstances of Maples’ case in a way that precluded 
(virtually) any other defendant from benefiting from the decision. 
Here is the meat of the ruling: 
In the unusual circumstances of this case, principles of agency 
law and fundamental fairness point to the same conclusion: 
There was indeed cause to excuse Maples’ procedural default. 
Through no fault of his own, Maples lacked the assistance of 
 
 13. Id. at 271. 
 14. Id. at 273–75. 
 15. Id. at 276–77. 
 16. Id. at 278. 
 17. Id. at 279. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See SUP. CT. R. 11; Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, Address to the American Bar 
Association: Work of the Federal Courts (Sept. 7, 1949), in 69 S. Ct. v, vi (1949) (explaining 
that the Court “is not, and has never been, primarily concerned with the correction of 
errors in lower court decisions”). 
 20. Maples, 565 U.S. at 290. 
 21. Id. at 271. 
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any authorized attorney during the 42 days Alabama allows for 
noticing an appeal from a trial court’s denial of postconviction 
relief. . . . [H]e had no reason to suspect that, in reality, he had 
been reduced to pro se status. Maples was disarmed by 
extraordinary circumstances quite beyond his control. He has 
shown ample cause, we hold, to excuse the procedural default 
into which he was trapped when counsel of record abandoned 
him without a word of warning.22 
Notice all of the elements (“the extraordinary facts,” the 
“unusual circumstances”) that in the Court’s view aligned to 
generate an outcome in Maples’ favor: the lack of fault on his part 
that meant he had no lawyer representing him during the entire 
critical period in which an appeal could be filed; the lack of notice 
to Maples so that he had “no reason” even to “suspect” he lacked 
representation; the “extraordinary circumstances” beyond 
Maples’ own control that “disarmed” him from acting; and his 
being “trapped” because he was “abandoned,” without a single 
“word of warning.” Lest there be any mistake that this doctrine 
was baked for Maples alone, Justice Alito, in a short concurring 
opinion, underscored the one-off nature of the decision. After 
identifying “eight unfortunate events”23 that “combined”24 to 
leave Maples without a lawyer, Alito concluded: “What occurred 
here was not a predictable consequence of the Alabama system 
but a veritable perfect storm of misfortune, a most unlikely 
combination of events that, without notice, effectively deprived 
petitioner of legal representation. Under these unique 
circumstances . . . petitioner’s procedural default is overcome.”25 
In sum, the Court produced a ruling for Cory Maples and him 
alone. While scores of other criminal defendants not named Cory 
Maples have cited the case, courts have had no trouble limiting it 
to the single beneficiary of the Supreme Court’s decision.26 
Four observations about golden tickets bear mention. First, 
the Supreme Court can only intervene to provide relief to an 
 
 22. Id. at 289. 
 23. Id. at 290 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 291–92. 
 26. See, e.g., Young v. Westbrooks, 702 F. App’x. 255, 265 (6th Cir. 2017) (“The 
Maples Court was careful to cabin its abandonment finding to the ‘extraordinary 
circumstances’ and ‘uncommon facts’ presented by that case.”); Raplee v. United States, 
842 F.3d 328, 334 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Although the facts of this case bear some similarity to 
those in Maples, they differ in a crucial respect: abandonment by his attorneys did not 
cause Raplee to miss the filing deadline.”). 
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individual defendant because it has the ability to limit the scope 
of a ruling all the way down to a single case. Without that option 
as an important element of the power to craft and control 
precedent, there would be no golden tickets. Without the ability 
to curtail precedential effect, the Justices would not grant relief to 
a Cory Maples, because doing so would open the door to other 
criminal defendants making similar claims upon the Court; and, 
worse—from the perspective of a Court that disfavors federal 
judges interfering with state criminal convictions27—to lower 
federal courts using the ruling to grant relief to other habeas 
petitioners at a clip that would outpace the Court’s limited 
capacity for review. The ability to limit a ruling at the outset is 
essential if the Court is to intervene to help the single petitioner 
like Cory Maples. 
Second, however, golden tickets, while beneficial to the 
recipient, are of uncertain systemic value. There is no particular 
reason Cory Maples should be helped while thousands of other 
convicted criminal defendants—whose own cases could be spun 
into a story of misfortune and injustice—are denied the same 
remedy. The power to create a subprecedent allows the Court to 
perform a one-time act of mercy. But the price of issuing 
occasional golden tickets may be high. Random acts of kindness 
serve to highlight the absence of systemic fairness—the 
foundational principle of the rule of law. Golden tickets also 
highlight the Court’s skepticism of lower federal courts 
intervening in state criminal cases. The Supreme Court itself 
doesn’t have the capacity to decide whether every individual 
habeas petitioner deserves help but it also doesn’t quite trust the 
lower courts to make those decisions with adequate respect for 
state processes. The end result, an occasional intervention by the 
Justices, looks more regal than judicial. 
A third observation is that just as Powerball winners discover 
that money doesn’t buy happiness, criminal defendants issued 
golden tickets may nonetheless find freedom beyond reach. For a 
win at the Supreme Court does not necessarily unlock the prison 
door. In 2015, on remand in Cory Maples’ case, the federal district 
court held that while, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s 
ruling, cause had been established, Maples had not shown 
 
 27. See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
979, 1015–28 (2010) (describing how federal legislation and Supreme Court decisions have 
curtailed federal habeas review).  
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prejudice from the procedural default.28 The district court 
therefore dismissed Maples’ habeas petition.29 In the spring of 
2018, the circuit court vacated that ruling, on the ground that in 
assessing prejudice, the district court had applied the wrong legal 
standard, and it remanded the case for a new hearing and ruling.30 
Cory Maples, who for now remains convicted and incarcerated on 
death row, might ultimately prevail, but his doing so will require 
more than what the Supreme Court gave him in 2012. 
A fourth observation is that while the Court tries very hard 
to limit golden tickets to an individual case, sometimes they turn 
out to have more general application. One example here is the 
Court’s 1932 decision in Powell v. Alabama,31 which held that, 
under the factual circumstances of the capital case presented, 
denying the defendants access to counsel worked a violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 Four 
decades later, the Court invoked Powell when it held, in Gideon 
v. Wainwright,33 that the Sixth Amendment conferred a more 
general obligation upon the states to provide criminal defendants 
with an attorney.34 Yet broad applications of golden tickets do not 
represent a failure. The Powell Court did not intend a general 
rule, but Gideon does not reveal a failed effort to limit the reach 
of a decision. By any measure, limiting a criminal procedural right 
for four decades (during which time states conducted millions of 
prosecutions) is a significant achievement. 
II. YOU NEVER CALL, YOU NEVER WRITE 
A second category of subprecedents also involves rulings that 
the Supreme Court confines to an individual case. In contrast to 
the golden tickets issued to criminal defendants and tailored 
closely to the facts of their cases, in this second category, the 
 
 28. Maples v. Dunn, No. 5:03–CV–2399–SLB, 2015 WL 5444096, at *14 (N.D. Ala. 
Sept. 14, 2015). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Maples v. Commissioner, No. 15-14586, 2018 WL 1640132, at *9 (11th Cir. Apr. 
5, 2018). 
 31. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
 32. Id. at 71. 
 33. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 343 (“While the Court, at the close of its Powell opinion, did, by 
its language, as this Court frequently does, limit its holding to the particular facts and 
circumstances of that case, its conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right to 
counsel are unmistakable.”). 
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Court decides a legal question with potentially enormous 
significance. Yet the Court never (or very rarely) cites or 
otherwise relies upon the ruling in later cases, even those that 
present very similar legal issues. As with golden tickets, the Court 
may signal in the ruling itself that it should be understood as 
confined to the particular case. But the more important feature is 
the Court’s own refusal to rely upon the ruling again. 
An obvious example here is Bush v. Gore.35 In that case, in a 
per curiam decision, the Supreme Court held that the state-wide 
manual recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court during the 
2000 presidential election violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment because of a lack of uniform recount 
standards.36 Seven justices supported that holding but they did not 
agree on the remedy.37 Five held that there was no possibility of 
fashioning a constitutional recount within the time remaining for 
Florida to take advantage of the safe harbor provision of 3 U.S.C. 
section 538—effectively ending Al Gore’s challenge to Florida’s 
certification of George W. Bush as the winner of the electoral 
votes in the state. Writing separately, however, Justices Breyer 
and Souter, while agreeing that there was an Equal Protection 
violation, took the position that a remedy could be implemented 
that satisfied the Constitution’s requirements and the case should 
be remanded for that purpose.39 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined 
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, issued a concurring opinion 
contending that the recount was also unconstitutional because the 
Florida Supreme Court had made new election law in violation of 
Article II Section 1.40 Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented in 
full.41 
In its per curiam decision, the Bush Court invoked general 
principles of equality in voting and cited landmark election 
cases,42 but it tied its holding to the 2000 election dispute. “Our 
consideration is limited,” the Court explained, “to the present 
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election 
 
 35. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 36. Id. at 103. 
 37. Id. at 111. 
 38. Id. at 110–11. 
 39. Id. at 134–35 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 146–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 137 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 42. See id. at 104–05 (first quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 
665 (1966); and then quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). 
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processes generally presents many complexities.”43 In other 
words, the ruling might not be one on which anyone in a different 
case in the future can rely. That is indeed how the Court later 
understood the case. Bush v. Gore has been the subject of many 
books and law review articles.44 The decision has been invoked in 
hundreds of election (and other) cases in the lower federal courts 
and the state courts.45 It has also been cited and discussed in many 
petitions and briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court.46 However, since 
2000, the decision has been cited just one time at the Supreme 
Court itself: by Justice Thomas, in a footnote in a dissent not 
joined by any other member of the Court and for the proposition 
that Article II permits the state legislatures to select presidential 
electors itself if it so chooses, not for the equal protection holding 
of the case.47 The Court, of course, has since decided many cases 
involving issues of equal protection and voting.48 Yet it has 
repeatedly done so without any mention of the equal protection 
ruling in Bush v. Gore. The Justices appear to have agreed that 
Bush v. Gore will not be spoken of again. Accordingly, the case 
has become limited, at least at the high court, to disputes where 
the parties are named Bush and Gore. 
Golden tickets start out as limited. Cases in this second 
category depend upon an ongoing commitment—a pact—on the 
 
 43. Id. at 109. 
 44. See, e.g., BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 
2002); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED 
ELECTION 2000 (2001); RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001). 
 45. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hamilton County Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 234–36, 241–
42 (6th Cir. 2011) (invoking Bush in reviewing a preliminary injunction in a case raising 
equal protection and due process challenges to a county board’s treatment of provisional 
ballots); Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 
121 P.3d 843, 856–57 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting plaintiff’s reliance upon Bush in a 
case challenging redistricting measures). 
 46. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Segovia v. United States, 2018 WL 
1920389, at *23 (2018) (No. 17-1463); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bergdoll v. Torres, 
2018 WL 1891485, at *15 (2018) (No. 17-1450); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pickens v. 
Gannett Co., Inc., 2016 WL 7494804, at *16 (2016) (No. 16-826).  
 47. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 36 n.2 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“This Court has recognized, however, that ‘the state legislature’s power to 
select the manner for appointing [presidential] electors is plenary; it may, if it chooses, 
select the electors itself.’”) (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam)). 
 48. See, e.g., Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016) 
(rejecting equal protection challenge to state legislative district map and providing 
extensive discussion of equal protecting and voting); Crawford v. Marion Cy. Election Bd., 
553 U.S. 181 (2008) (rejecting Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state voter 
identification law). 
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part of the Justices to keep a ruling confined to the case in which 
it was made. Maintaining this consensus over an extended 
period—nearly two decades now for Bush v. Gore—is not an easy 
accomplishment (though perhaps as the years tick by, acting 
against the consensus becomes more costly for an individual 
Justice). One wonders, for example, how many times individual 
Justices have been tempted to cite the case but then changed their 
minds; how often a law clerk (likely in diapers during the 2000 
election) has innocently slipped in a reference to the case in a 
draft opinion, only to have it excised by the Justice. Where, 
though, the pact can be created and maintained, it provides the 
Court with a powerful tool to intervene in a single case without 
having to confront the broader implications of the ruling. In 
essence, while Kozel emphasizes competition among the Justices 
to specify the scope of precedent, in this category of subprecedent, 
we have, instead, convergence among the Court’s members on not 
giving a case precedential authority. That, too, is part of our 
system of stare decisis. 
III. TICKING TIME BOMBS 
A third category of subprecedents involves decisions that the 
Supreme Court designates as limited in time. One example is 
Grutter v. Bollinger,49 decided in 2003. In that case, the Court held 
that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit the University 
of Michigan Law School from considering race, as part of an 
individualized review of applicants taking into account all factors 
that contribute to diversity, in order to obtain the educational 
benefits of a diverse student body.50 However, the ruling 
contained a built-in expiration date. Writing that because “a core 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all 
governmentally imposed discrimination based on race,”51 Justice 
O’Connor for the Court concluded that “race-conscious 
admissions policies must be limited in time.”52 Because racial 
classifications are “potentially . . . dangerous,”53 she explained, 
“they may be employed no more broadly than the interest 
 
 49. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 50. Id. at 333. 
 51. Id. at 341–43 (quotation omitted). 
 52. Id. at 342. 
 53. Id. 
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demands”54 and “[e]nshrining a permanent justification for racial 
preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection 
principle.”55 Therefore, the Court held, race-conscious admissions 
programs “must have a logical end point.”56 This meant two 
things. First, specific programs must be limited: the “durational 
requirement” could be met with “sunset provisions . . . and 
periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still 
necessary to achieve student body diversity.”57 Second, there was 
a more general outer limit to race-based affirmative action 
programs: twenty-five years.58 Why that period? “It has been 25 
years,” O’Connor explained in 2003, “since Justice Powell [in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke] first approved the 
use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the 
context of public higher education.”59 Because, in that intervening 
period, “the number of minority applicants with high grades and 
test scores has . . . increased,”60 an end to lawful consideration of 
race was on the horizon: “We expect that 25 years from now, the 
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the 
interest approved today.”61 
Temporal limits can serve significant purposes. They can be 
an effective mechanism for bringing on board members of the 
Court who might not approve of the bottom line but nonetheless 
can live with a decision that, by design, is not forever. Indeed, a 
member of the Court might be inclined to join a decision just in 
order to ensure it contains an expiration date. Temporal limits can 
also promote agreement by persuading members of the Court 
who, again, do not support the bottom line, to sign on to a future 
case making use of the expiring precedent. Consider, in this 
regard, the Court’s most recent affirmative action case, Fisher v. 
University of Texas.62 In that case, the Court upheld a 
supplemental undergraduate admissions program at the 
University of Texas that took account of the race of applicants.63 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 343. 
 59. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 63. Id. at 2215. 
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Justice Kennedy, who had dissented in Grutter, wrote the majority 
opinion in Fisher to uphold the challenged program and in so 
doing he reiterated the durational limits Grutter had announced.64 
A second feature of this form of subprecedent is that when 
the expiration date arrives the question of overruling the decision 
does not (or arguably does not) even arise. Instead, the case can 
just die its natural death. And even if a future court wants to keep 
the patient alive, when it confronts the question whether to 
overrule, one key factor, “whether the rule is subject to a kind of 
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of 
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation,”65 will 
support overruling the past decision. After all, nobody could have 
reasonably relied upon a decision that, by its own stated terms, is 
set to expire. Indeed, any reliance interests would be based upon 
the expectation that the decision is only good for a stated period. 
Nobody, in other words, should arrange their affairs in 
expectation that in 2028 race-based affirmative action programs 
in university admissions will be constitutional: the sensible 
approach would be to plan for their end. In short, subprecedents 
with expiration dates allow members of the Court to rig at the 
outset the stare decisis analysis that will occur in the future, 
perhaps long after those members themselves have left the Court. 
IV. SLIP SLIDIN’ AWAY 
The above three categories of subprecedent all involve cases 
limited by the Court at the time they are decided. A fourth 
category of subprecedents consists of decisions that start out as 
having ordinary precedential effect but later end up limited. In 
this category are cases that, while not overturned, are undercut or 
reworked by subsequent decisions by a Court that aims 
deliberately to weaken the significance of the earlier ruling, in 
other words to turn it into a subprecedent. 
One example here is Katzenbach v. Morgan.66 That case 
involved the constitutionality of Section 4(e) of the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act, which prohibited the use of literacy tests to deny the 
franchise to non-English speakers who had completed a sixth-
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 66. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
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grade education in Puerto Rico.67 Congress had enacted Section 
4(e) using its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement 
powers,68 but the VRA provision seemed inconsistent with the 
Court’s own 1959 decision in Lassiter v. Northampton Board of 
Elections, that literacy requirements were constitutionally valid.69 
The Morgan case asked whether, under those circumstances, the 
federal statutory provision validly trumped a provision of New 
York’s own election laws requiring, as a condition of voting, 
ability to read and write English.70 
In upholding congressional power to enact Section 4(e) (and 
thus displace the New York requirement), the Supreme Court, in 
an opinion by Justice Brennan, provided two rationales. First, he 
reasoned, prohibiting literacy tests could be viewed as ordinary 
remedial legislation protecting judicially-recognized rights to 
non-discriminatory treatment by the government in provision of 
its services.71 Second, Brennan found, the law was also sustainable 
as directly targeting unconstitutional state laws.72 In that regard, 
the Court allowed Congress leeway to determine the reach of 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and hence of its own 
powers under section 5. In reaching this outcome, the Court 
specifically rejected the New York Attorney General’s argument 
that “§ 4(e) cannot be sustained as appropriate legislation to 
enforce the Equal Protection Clause unless the judiciary decides 
. . . that the application of the English literacy requirement 
prohibited by § 4(e) is forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause 
itself.”73 Brennan reasoned instead that “[a] construction of § 5 [of 
the Fourteenth Amendment] that would require a judicial 
determination that the enforcement of the state law precluded by 
Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining 
the congressional enactment, would depreciate both 
congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility 
for implementing the Amendment.”74 Because Congress was 
given enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court’s task was merely to decide whether, 
 
 67. Id. at 643. 
 68. Id. at 648. 
 69. Lassiter, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 70. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 646–47. 
 71. Id. at 652. 
 72. Id. at 654. 
 73. Id. at 648. 
 74. Id. 
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“without regard to whether the judiciary would find that the 
Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies New York’s English 
literacy requirement as so applied . . . Congress [could] prohibit 
the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”75 The answer to that question, 
Brennan explained, was “limited to determining whether such 
legislation is, as required by § 5, appropriate legislation to enforce 
the Equal Protection Clause.”76 Under the announced standard, 
the provision was easily sustained. Congress was entitled to 
determine that literacy requirements violated the Equal 
Protection Clause even if the Court itself would not necessarily 
reach that conclusion.77 In response to Justice Harlan’s criticism 
in his dissenting opinion that the majority “reads § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress the power to define 
the substantive scope of the Amendment” such that Congress 
could also “dilute equal protection and due process decisions of 
this Court,”78 Brennan included his famous footnote specifying 
that Congress’s power to define rights ran in only one direction.79 
Three decades after Morgan, the Court decided City of 
Boerne v. Flores.80 The Boerne Court held, in an opinion by 
Justice Kennedy, that Congress lacked power under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to impose upon the states the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).81 That statute, 
enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith,82 prohibited the government from 
substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion, even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the 
government can demonstrate the burden furthers a compelling 
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that interest.83 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy 
held that RFRA, as applied to the states, was invalid because 
 
 75. Id. at 649. 
 76. Id. at 649–50. 
 77. Id. at 653. 
 78. Id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 651, n.10 (“We emphasize that Congress’ power under § 5 is limited to 
adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no 
power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”).  
 80. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 81. Id. at 551. 
 82. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 83. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512–15. 
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Congress’s power is limited to “enforcing”84 the substantive 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment (here, including the 
incorporated protections of the First). Given the Court’s ruling in 
Smith rejecting the application of a compelling interest test with 
respect to generally applicable laws, RFRA exceeded Congress’s 
authority. “Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause,” Kennedy explained, “cannot be said to be 
enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional 
right by changing what the right is.”85 In particular, RFRA 
interfered with the power of the judiciary: “When the Court has 
interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of 
the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law 
is. . . . Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital 
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the 
federal balance.”86 What about Morgan’s recognition of 
congressional power to ratchet up rights beyond a judicial floor? 
Kennedy wrote that while “[t]here is language in our [Morgan] 
opinion . . . which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power 
in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained 
in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” such a reading was not “a 
necessary interpretation” of the case, “or even the best one.”87 
Instead, Kennedy explained, the Morgan Court had “perceived a 
factual basis” that justified Congress’s intervention so that the 
decision to uphold section 4(e) of the VRA “rested on 
unconstitutional discrimination by New York and Congress’ 
reasonable attempt to combat it.”88 In other words, according to 
Kennedy, the Morgan Court agreed that there existed an equal 
protection violation, so that the condition for use of the section 5 
power was met. The Morgan holding was thus recast, not cast 
aside; turned from precedent into subprecedent. 
Many commentators take the position that, in light of 
Boerne, reliance upon an expansive reading of Morgan—in which 
Congress can ratchet up rights—is no longer defensible. 
Understanding Morgan as a subprecedent suggests a different 
conclusion. Morgan (expansively understood) has not been 
 
 84. Id. at 519. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 536. 
 87. Id. at 528. 
 88. Id. 
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overruled. It thus still lingers: perhaps not worth much, but 
nonetheless still alive. Its continued existence as a subprecedent 
means it might, one day, return to the stage in a starring role. It 
might, in other words, be turned back into ordinary precedent and 
guide the resolution of a future case. For one thing, the Supreme 
Court might itself reinvigorate Morgan. A shift in the composition 
of the Court or a reassessment of notions of congressional versus 
judicial power on some particular issue might result in the 
majority of the Justices doing to Boerne what Boerne did to 
Morgan: announcing that those of us who imagined that Boerne 
stood for the proposition that Congress lacks power to define 
substantive rights were interpreting Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
a way neither “necessary” nor “best.” The Court could then well 
march forward with a generous understanding of congressional 
power grounded in Morgan and citing extensively Brennan’s 
opinion without any need to account for a doctrinal change. 
Likewise, Morgan’s continued existence might lead a creative 
lower court or Congress itself to rely upon the case in support of 
expansive congressional power. After all, there exist multiple easy 
ways to limit Boerne: as addressing an improper legislative effort 
to overturn a recent Supreme Court decision, for instance, or as 
addressing Congress’s power in the sole context of religious free 
exercise (and not, as in Morgan, equal protection or voting). In 
sum, making earlier precedent a subprecedent—rather than just 
overturning it—creates opportunities that might be seized by a 
later Court or by other actors. 
Nonetheless, opportunity carries risk. A court that recasts 
rather than overturns a prior decision may not be able to control 
future uses of the case—whether by a future Court or by other 
players. Hence, a telltale signal of cases within this fourth category 
is that members of the Court majority perceive the risks and 
object that the prior decision has been recast rather than 
overturned. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action89 
provides an example. In rejecting an equal protection challenge 
to a state constitutional amendment barring (among other things) 
public universities from considering race in admissions, Schuette 
recast earlier political process cases including Hunter v. Erickson90 
and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.91 Justice Scalia 
 
 89. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).  
 90. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 91. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
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(joined by Justice Thomas) criticized the Schuette plurality for 
“reinterpreting” these two earlier cases “beyond recognition” and 
called instead for them simply to be overruled.92 That call reflects 
an understanding that limiting a case, even severely so, does not 
necessarily spell its end. 
V. STAIRWAYS TO HEAVEN 
A fifth category of subprecedents involves cases that, at the 
time they are issued, are presented as limited but then later turn 
out to be building blocks of broader rulings. In this manner, 
subprecedents serve, sometimes by deliberate design, as a 
staircase or bridge to a momentous decision in the future. 
The Court’s recent Voting Rights Act decisions provide a 
good example. In 2009, in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility 
District No. One v. Holder,93 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a 
unanimous Court, held that as a statutory matter all political 
subdivisions were eligible to seek a bailout from the preclearance 
provisions of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.94 Because the 
utility district that brought the case was therefore entitled to seek 
bailout as a statutory matter, the Court did not rule on the 
district’s additional argument that, in extending Section 5 for an 
additional 25 years in 2006 based upon the decades-old coverage 
formula of section 4(b), Congress had exceeded its powers under 
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.95 In the course of his 
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts highlighted “federalism 
concerns”96 the 2006 VRA extension presented. Nonetheless, in 
light of the statutory ruling, Roberts concluded: “Whether 
conditions continue to justify such legislation is a difficult 
constitutional question we do not answer today.”97 Justice 
Thomas, concurring in the statutory holding, would have reached 
the constitutional issue: in his opinion, “the lack of current 
evidence of intentional discrimination with respect to voting 
renders §5 unconstitutional.”98 However, all of the other members 
of the Court joined Roberts’ opinion in full. 
 
 92. 134 S. Ct. at 1642 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 93. 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009). 
 94. Id. at 211. 
 95. Id. at 197, 211. 
 96. Id. at 203. 
 97. Id. at 211. 
 98. Id. at 216 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Four years later, Roberts also authored the Court’s opinion 
in Shelby County v. Holder,99 ruling that the section 4(b) coverage 
formula was unconstitutional and thus did not support the Section 
5 pre-clearance requirements.100 This time, the Court’s ruling was 
5-4. In the course of his opinion, Roberts repeatedly invoked and 
quoted from Northwest Austin,101 which he presented as 
foretelling the outcome. “[W]e expressed serious doubts about 
the Act’s continued constitutionality,”102 Roberts wrote of 
Northwest Austin; “[e]ight Members of the Court subscribed to 
these views, and the remaining Member would have held the Act 
unconstitutional.”103 Northwest Austin, then, paved the way to 
invalidating in Shelby County the contested provision of the 
VRA. 
Deploying subprecedents to build bridges (or staircases) has 
an obvious benefit. The Court can act as though it is not breaking 
new ground but merely completing an edifice already underway. 
This explains Roberts’ repeated invocation, in Shelby County, of 
Northwest Austin and his reminder that that decision was 
unanimous. In Roberts’ presentation, invalidating the coverage 
formula involved nothing more than putting the next foot 
forward. The approach obviously depends upon persuasion that a 
prior, seemingly weak case actually has strong legs. Therein lies 
the risk. Other members of the Court may well object to the 
transformative role of a subprecedent, particularly one they 
signed onto in its modest form. Thus, in Shelby County, the four 
dissenters strongly objected to Roberts’ use of the opinion in 
Northwest Austin that they had joined. Writing for the dissent, 
Justice Ginsburg took the position that the relevant precedent 
was not Northwest Austin but South Carolina v. Katzenbach,104 in 
which the Court had rejected federalism challenges to the VRA’s 
coverage formula and pre-clearance provisions.105 Ginsburg did 
not remotely share Roberts’ view that Northwest Austin had pre-
 
 99. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).  
 100. Id. at 556. 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 542 (“These basic principles [of Northwest Austin] guide our review 
of the question before us.”); id. at 544, 553. 
 102. Id. at 540. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 105. Id. at 336; see Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 568 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“Katzenbach supplies the standard of review.”). 
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ordained holding those VRA provisions now invalid.106 Among 
other points, Ginsburg objected particularly to Roberts’ 
invocation of Northwest Austin to support his application, in 
Shelby County, of a constitutional principle of equal state 
sovereignty. She wrote: 
If the Court is suggesting that dictum in Northwest Austin 
silently overruled Katzenbach’s limitation of the equal 
sovereignty doctrine to “the admission of new States,” the 
suggestion is untenable. Northwest Austin cited Katzenbach’s 
holding in the course of declining to decide whether the VRA 
was constitutional or even what standard of review applied to 
the question. In today’s decision, the Court ratchets up what 
was pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing breadth to the 
equal sovereignty principle in flat contradiction of 
Katzenbach.107 
Of course, these are the words of the dissent. Roberts himself 
was able to keep a majority to deploy Northwest Austin to 
invalidate key components of the VRA. 
The possibility of the Court creating subprecedents as a step 
towards or as the basis for a more momentous ruling in the future 
has some implications for Kozel’s project to forge a commitment 
to stare decisis in a world of “interpretive pluralism” (p. 99). If the 
Justices indeed overcome interpretive divides and sign onto a 
strong form of stare decisis but, at the same time, they can 
strategically craft limited rulings for later deployment towards 
larger goals, there is likely to quickly emerge a significant 
feedback effect upon how cases are decided. Justices who commit 
to stare decisis, and especially to a doctrine that “no precedent 
may be jettisoned unless a supermajority of justices votes to 
overrule it” (p. 157), but fear another Northwest Austin/Shelby 
County episode will be disinclined to join rulings holding, stating, 
or suggesting anything beyond precisely what they individually 
support in full. As a result, getting to five, let alone nine, may well 
require decisions and opinions limited in the extreme and with 
language specifying the shared understood scope of a ruling. In 
other words, many cases (and perhaps all) might end up being 
resolved as narrow, fact-specific subprecedents that carry 
warnings against any broader use. For instance, the Court’s 
 
 106. Roberts thus complained that the dissenting Justices had missed the significance 
of the 2009 ruling. Id. at 556.  
 107. Id. at 588 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  
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opinion in Northwest Austin might have looked very different had 
Justice Ginsburg predicted its later use. But the problem is 
broader than four Justices sometimes being hoodwinked. After 
Shelby County, all of the Justices would be wise to wonder 
whether something they sign onto or do not object to today will 
be deployed against them tomorrow. The final outcome, where 
there exists both stare decisis and suspicion, could be the Court 
regularly issuing a per curiam decision that simply announces the 
judgment—accompanied by nine separate opinions in which each 
Justice sets out his or her own view of the case and its proper 
disposition.108 
VI. OUT OF STEAM 
So far the examples of subprecedent have involved cases 
where the Justices themselves exercise control over and 
manipulate the reach and limits of their rulings. We turn next to 
two additional categories of subprecedent in which the Court is 
not in control. Both categories involve instances where efforts on 
the part of the Justices to create and manage precedent flounder 
so that subprecedents result. 
One category involves cases in which the Court acts 
ambitiously to move doctrine in a new direction but where the 
effort does not succeed. Whereas super precedents serve as 
“foundations for subsequent lines of judicial decisions,”109 the 
subprecedents in this category involve doctrinal innovations that 
run out of steam. United States v. Lopez,110 the Court’s 1995 
decision invalidating the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act as 
beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power,111 is a good 
example. When Lopez was decided, commentators spoke of the 
beginning of a federalism revolution.112 As the Court issued 
additional decisions limiting national power, including United 
 
 108. This is not unheard of. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 109. Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 1213. 
 110. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 111. Id. at 551. 
 112. United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1233 (5th Cir. 1997) (Smith, J., dissenting) 
(“Lopez is a landmark, signaling the revival of federalism as a constitutional principle, and 
it must be acknowledged as a watershed decision in the history of the Commerce Clause.”); 
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 129 (2001) (citing the “revolution” in federalism doctrine). 
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States v. Morrison,113 debate centered on just how far this 
federalism revolution would go. 
However, the statute in Lopez itself was promptly and easily 
corrected with minimal congressional effort and the revolution, if 
ever there was, soon seemed to come to a halt.114 In 2005, in 
Gonzales v. Raich,115 the Court upheld the application of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act to marijuana grown at home 
for personal use that was never bought or sold and never moved 
across any state line.116 Over a strong dissent by three members of 
the Lopez majority,117 the Court explained that Congress could 
reach intrastate non-commercial activities as part of a broader 
regulation of the interstate economy118—thus providing Congress 
with a green light for renewed broad regulation under the 
Commerce Clause. 
At his confirmation hearing, John G. Roberts described 
Lopez and Morrison as merely “two decisions in the more than 
200-year sweep of decisions in which the Supreme Court has . . . 
recognized extremely broad authority on Congress’s part, going 
all the way back to Gibbons v. Ogden and Chief Justice John 
Marshall, when those Commerce Clause decisions were important 
in binding the Nation together as a single commercial unit” and 
he observed that Raich had demonstrated that Lopez and 
Morrison did not “junk all the cases that came before” them.119 
Responding to Senator Feinstein’s question (about Lopez), “[A]t 
what point does crime influence commerce?,” Roberts stated: “I 
think it does. . . . [The Act] didn’t have a requirement that the 
firearm be transported in interstate commerce . . . . [If] the Act 
had required that, which I think . . . it’s fairly easy to show in 
 
 113. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 114. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations 
About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1441 (2009) (“Even without any 
relevant change in the Court’s composition, the Federalism Revolution inaugurated by 
Lopez sputtered out.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds 
Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 529 (2011) (“The Court’s federalism 
revolution seems to have gone out with a whimper, leaving little room for constitutional 
regulation of the issue.”). 
 115. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 116. Id. at 10. 
 117. Id. at 45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 118. Id. at 17. 
 119. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
225, 271–72 (2005). 
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almost every case . . . then that would have been within the 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.”120 
The views of somebody hoping to persuade the Senate to 
confirm him to the Supreme Court may be a poor guide as to how 
the judiciary understands (or should understand) the scope of 
congressional power. As to guns near schools, though, we also 
have some numbers. In 1994, there were three cases filed under 
the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 (the statute at issue in 
Lopez).121 In 1995, seven new cases were filed under the statute in 
the months prior to the Court’s invalidation of the law (in April 
of that year).122 In response to Lopez, in September of 1996 
Congress reenacted the invalidated statute with a new Commerce 
Clause hook that constrained the law’s application to any firearm 
“that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign 
commerce.”123 Prosecutors wasted no time in putting the revised 
statute to use: by the close of 1996, 42 cases had been filed in 
federal district court.124  
Lopez—recall the revolution—had aspirations of super-
precedence, but within a short period it had plainly failed to 
achieve the goal. Today, because Lopez does not meaningfully 
constrain congressional power (not even to regulate guns in or 
near schools) it is best understood as a subprecedent. 
In sum, Lopez demonstrates that efforts to create a strong 
line of doctrine might not succeed. Courts that trade on 
commitments to stare decisis to launch doctrinal innovations run 
the risk that those efforts will come up short. Subprecedent, 
because it might be unplanned, captures that phenomenon. 
VII. UNSETTLED 
Unplanned subprecedents also constitute a seventh and the 
final category. In this category, subprecedents emerge when case 
 
 120. Id. at 349. 
 121. Jason Mazzone & Carl Emery Woock, Federalism as Docket Control, 94 N.C. L. 
REV. 7, 82 (2015) (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics). 
 122. Id. 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998). The amendments were included in the 
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369-71 (1996). 
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the statute, as amended, is 
constitutional, lower courts have upheld it. See, e.g., United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 
(8th Cir. 1999) (holding the revised statute constitutional); United States v. Tait, 202 F.3d 
1320 (11th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 124. Mazzone & Woock, supra note 121. 
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law is not settled. Despite efforts by the Court to issue a solid 
doctrinal line that will guide future decisionmaking, the Court 
issues contrary and confusing decisions in short periods of time. 
The result is that, like a television screen that never focuses, 
reliable doctrinal rules fail ever to come into view. We are left 
with a muddle of cases that lack general reliability. 
A prime example is the Court’s shifting and confusing rulings 
on the constitutionality of the death penalty. The story is well 
known and requires only brief explication. In 1972, following 
growing public concern with how the death penalty was 
administered, in Furman v. Georgia the Court issued a single-
paragraph per curiam order holding that in the cases before it the 
state capital punishment statutes, by giving too much discretion to 
prosecutors and juries, violated the Eighth Amendment. 125 The 
per curiam order was accompanied, bizarrely, by nine separate 
opinions: one from each Justice, and with no Justice joining in any 
other. The effect of Furman was to halt the use of the death 
penalty until, four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,126 the Court 
ruled that intervening reforms in state sentencing processes had 
resolved the constitutional infirmities. 
The transition from Furman to Georgia itself produced 
uncertainty: would the Court in another four years again reverse 
course? But that is just one chapter in the story. Since 1976, the 
Court has issued, without discernable rhyme or reason, a string of 
decisions invalidating the use of the death penalty in particular 
circumstances: for rape of an adult woman where the victim is not 
killed;127 for murder absent specific aggravating factors;128 for a 
minor participant in a felony who does not kill, attempt to kill, or 
intend to kill;129 if the defendant is insane;130 for crimes committed 
at age fifteen or younger;131 and for child rape and other crimes 
that did not result in death of a victim.132 
 
 125. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 126. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 127. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 128. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
 129. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Still, five years later, the Court held 
imposition of the death penalty is valid for a felony-murder defendant who was a major 
participant in the underlying felony and exhibits extreme indifference to human life. Tison 
v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 130. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 131. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 132. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
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Yet the trajectory of the death penalty cases has not been in 
a single direction. The Court held in 1989, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 
that the death penalty could be imposed for crimes committed at 
age 16 or 17,133 but then overruled that decision in 2005 in Roper 
v. Simmons.134 In 1989, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held that 
there was no bar to executing a mentally-retarded defendant,135 
but overruled that decision thirteen years later in Atkins v. 
Virginia.136 In 1990, in Walton v. Arizona, the Court held that a 
judge could find the requisite aggravating factors for imposition 
of the death penalty;137 in 2002, in Ring v. Arizona, the Court held 
these factors must be found by a jury.138 
We are also clearly not at the end of the story. Recently, in a 
case involving the validity of Oklahoma’s lethal-injection 
protocol,139 Justice Breyer (joined by Justice Ginsburg) wrote a 
forty-page dissent calling for consideration of whether, as it is 
administered today, the death penalty has become 
unconstitutional.140 Justices often reiterate their view that a case 
has been wrongly decided and should be overturned. But Breyer’s 
point was different. He explained that since Gregg, “[t]he 
circumstances and the evidence of the death penalty’s application 
have changed radically” and that “[g]iven those changes, I believe 
that it is now time to reopen the question.”141 Breyer argued that 
four decades of experience showed that efforts on the part of the 
states to develop adequate processes for administering capital 
punishment “ha[d] failed”142 and that “[t]oday’s administration of 
the death penalty involves three fundamental constitutional 
defects: (1) serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application, 
and (3) unconscionably long delays that undermine the death 
penalty’s penological purpose.”143 Citing dozens of empirical 
studies and other evidence, Breyer concluded: 
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I recognize that in 1972 this Court, in a sense, turned to 
Congress and the state legislatures in its search for standards 
that would increase the fairness and reliability of imposing a 
death penalty. The legislatures responded. But, in the last four 
decades, considerable evidence has accumulated that those 
responses have not worked. Thus we are left with a judicial 
responsibility. The Eighth Amendment sets forth the relevant 
law, and we must interpret that law. . . . I believe it highly likely 
that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment. At the 
very least, the Court should call for full briefing on the basic 
question.144 
Breyer has since pressed the same argument in other cases.145 
The Court’s shifting case law on capital punishment and the 
death penalty poses a basic question: why should anybody adhere 
to any particular decision when, to state the obvious, lives are at 
stake? No sensible observer would confidently conclude that if, in 
reliance upon the patchwork of current Supreme Court decisions, 
we execute a particular defendant today, ten years from now we 
will still consider the execution consistent with the Constitution. 
Subprecedents, including those that are unplanned, simply do not 
provide reliable guidance to lower courts and other actors. 
Here, a comparative law lens brings some additional clarity. 
Recently, the Constitutional Court of Italy has taken the position 
that domestic courts should only defer to rulings of the European 
Court of Human Rights on the requirements of the European 
Convention on Human Rights if those judgments represent 
“consolidated . . . case law,”146 that is, “case-law which has been 
consistently applied”147 by the European Court. If, instead, a 
decision of the European Court involves a new interpretation or 
ruling, or the court, over time, has not been consistent in its 
interpretations and applications of Convention provisions, then 
domestic courts are free to ignore the rulings that the European 
Court issues.148 On this view, it makes little sense for domestic 
courts, though bound by the Convention (and the European 
Court’s interpretations of it) to follow a ruling that reflects “a 
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position that has . . . [not yet] become final,”149 such that there is 
not a “definitive choice in favor of one approach [to the 
Convention provision at issue] as opposed to another.”150 This, in 
essence, is the recognition that subprecedents may result from 
confused lines of decision and that their force in a hierarchical 
system is weaker—and, at least in the view of the Italian court—
justifiably so. 
CONCLUSION 
Subprecedents are an important component of a legal system 
that values stare decisis. Any effort to understand how stare 
decisis operates, how it shapes and constrains judicial 
decisionmaking, and how it might usefully be reoriented or 
reformed requires attention also to the nature and purposes of 
subprecedents. As this essay demonstrates, subprecedents can 
take different forms and serve different roles. Sometimes, 
subprecedents empower courts. They allow judges to issue rulings 
limited to individual cases and circumstances and thus to head off 
broader uses and applications of a decision or its supporting 
rationale. Subprecedents permit judges also to control the future 
by building into rulings temporal limits and expiration dates and 
by manipulating in advance any later stare decisis analysis. In 
addition, subprecedents provide a powerful tool for courts to 
reach back and curtail the scope of a case that has fallen out of 
favor rather than having to overrule it. Subprecedents can also 
quietly pave the way to and provide later justification for a 
momentous decision down the road. Sometimes, however, 
subprecedents thwart judicial control and ambition. They can stop 
a doctrinal revolution in its tracks. They can also render an area 
of law shifting and confused in ways that free up and empower 
lower court judges and other legal actors who are normally 
constrained by vertical stare decisis. 
Recently, in confirmation hearings and in the academic 
literature, super-precedents—cases that seem immune to 
overruling—have occupied a good deal of spotlight. That is not 
hard to understand. For those who, like Kozel, favor a strong 
commitment to stare decisis, particularly in constitutional cases, 
as well as for those who worry that such a commitment may be of 
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exaggerated importance or even misguided, designation of some 
cases as having stronger precedential effect than others requires 
close attention. Subprecedents merit equal consideration. While 
super-precedents take center stage, subprecedents tend to 
operate with quiet persistence in the background. Nonetheless, in 
important and often unnoticed ways, subprecedents shape 
opportunities to seek and obtain legal remedies, facilitate and 
constrain judicial decision-making, and, ultimately, guide the 
direction of the law. 
 
